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CHAPTER 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between economic development and democratization has been a hotly 
debated topic in political science for many years.  Students of Chinese politics have long been 
concerned about the potential democratic transformation caused by the economic liberalization 
of this Socialist country dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for over five 
decades.  Despite dramatic domestic economic reforms and a much more engaged and open 
posture vis-à-vis the outside world, the CCP has not dramatically changed its authoritarian way 
of governance.  Some observers have argued that the authoritarian government will be able to 
adjust and consolidate, thereby allowing it to stay in power.  However, the constant social 
changes in China brought about by recent economic development have started to put increasing 
pressure on the state for political changes.  The emergence of a new middle class and its 
members’ numerous social and political demands are among the most pressing challenges facing 
the Chinese state in this period of rapid economic change.   
However, as scholars of China have started to explore the political leanings of the new 
middle class in China and what role it will play in transforming the political structure of China, 
the results have not been very clear.  On the one hand, the middle class members are expected to 
demand political opening because they are wealthier and better educated.  On the other hand, 
they may withdraw such demands if they are afraid that their wealth and social status could be 
taken from them by the Communist authority and destroyed by political changes.  The latter has
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 made some scholars argue that it is unlikely that the middle class members in China will 
participate in politics to demand political changes. 
The emergence of some middle class campaigners running for District-level People’s 
Congress (DPC) elections in 2003 has given us an opportunity to study the Chinese middle 
class’s attitudes toward political participation and whether their desire for participation will 
contribute to democratization in China.  During these elections in Shenzhen and Beijing, dozens 
of middle class Chinese conducted election campaigns to be nominated as candidates and elected 
as people’s deputies (renda daibiao) to the DPCs, a relatively powerless organization in Chinese 
political structure.   
This thesis examines the motivations of the middle class members for participating in 
politics.   It is especially interested in exploring why the middle class members wanted to run for 
people’s deputies in the DPCs that do not have real political power, and how their behavior 
might influence political change in China.  Moreover, by studying the Chinese middle class’ 
political attitudes, the thesis tries to shed light on the middle class’s roles in democratization in 
general.   
By systematically analyzing the candidates’ campaign speeches and activities and their 
speeches during the media interviews, this study reveals that the major motivating factors behind 
the middle class DPC candidates’ decision to run for the elections were to protect their property 
interests and their increasing desire to defend political rights.  This thesis argues that the 
campaigners’ actions in Shenzhen and Beijing will affect the democratization process in China in 
two ways.  First, it will help to legitimize the democratic and competitive election procedures in 
future grassroots elections in China.  Second, the fact that the campaigners applied legalistic 
means to defend their political rights granted by the state law also indicated a change in the way 
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middle class members confront the authoritarian state.  This thesis suggests that the legalistic 
means used by the DPC election campaigners will pose a threat to the monopoly of power by the 
CCP and incur potential institutional changes in China in the future.   
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The study of the new middle class’s motivations to run for local elections is important as 
it could help us understand the tendency of their political participation and how the participation 
would affect the existing political structure.  The Chinese middle class candidates’ decision to 
run for the DPC elections is exclusively worth investigating considering the fact that the people’s 
congress system is not given real political power in the status quo of the Chinese politics.  The 
study on the subject may help us see the changes of people’s views on local people’s congresses 
and politics in general.  This section will explore why running for people’s congress elections is 
unusual in China and lay out the research questions that this thesis will seek to answer. 
The people’s Congress in China is granted superior power by the Chinese Constitution. 
“All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which 
the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and the local people's 
congresses at different levels.”1  People’s deputies at various levels of congresses are elected by 
the Chinese people to represent their interests and will do so by participating “in the exercise of 
State power in accordance with the functions and powers vested in the people's congresses at the 
corresponding levels by the Constitution and relevant laws.”2   
The law endows many functions to People’s Congress and deputies such as monitoring 
the government, legislation, appointment of bureaucrats, decision-making on substantial policies, 
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etc.  However, in reality, the primary role of the people’s congress system is “more nominal than 
real” (Nathan 1985, 194).  People’s deputies basically serve as a “link” (niudai) between the 
government and the people.  They represent the “state authority” and are responsible to provide 
“a rationale for policy” made by the state and diffuse “societal pressures” (O’Brien 1994, 359).3  
In other words, rather than representing the interests of voters, people’s deputies appear to be 
unpaid government staff whose job is to mobilize “the masses to implement decisions made by 
the central government rather than actually making decisions” (Shi 1999b, 1118).  Because the 
Chinese People’s Congress has “a less powerful political status than governments, not to mention 
the Party,” it has been largely regarded as a rubber stamp (Young 2002, 726).  Overtime, this has 
become an informal but widely recognized rule in the Chinese political system. 
The direct election of Local People’s Congress (LPC) and indirect election of people’s 
congresses of higher levels have also been strictly controlled by the CCP.4  Although the CCP 
amended the election law5 in the late 1970s to let voters directly elect the deputies to local 
people’s congresses, nominate candidates, choose among multiple candidates, and vote secretly, 
it has continued to control the entire process of LPC elections such as voter registration, 
nomination, mobilizing voters, duration of election campaigns, etc.  The amended election law 
also prohibits formation of political parties and precludes electoral competition6. 
Given the constraints of LPC elections from the CCP and considering the weakness of the 
People’s Congress, Chinese voters usually vote without enthusiasm, and very few would bother 
to run for LPC elections.  As suggested by McCormick’s research on Chinese local people’s 
congress elections, even after their candidacy was confirmed, candidates had not intended to 
become a deputy and had not taken any effort to secure their elections.  McCormick concluded 
that, “candidates rarely campaign in the usual sense of that word” (McCormick 1996, 40-41).   
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Election campaigning is almost unimaginable to the Chinese people especially after the 
election law was amended in 1982.  The amended election law in 1979 once stated, “The 
political parties, mass organizations and voters may introduce deputy candidates by all kinds of 
means” (Yuan 2003, 223).  Then in the 1980 LPC elections, some college students and workers 
in Beijing, Changsha and Shanghai ran election campaigns by organizing rallies and passing 
literatures to test the amended law (Nathan 1985, 205-07).  Worried that the heated campaigning 
activities were producing potential “social disorder”, the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
amended the law in 1982 and specified the ways candidates could interact with voters and call 
for their support (Nathan 1985, 223).  It states, “The electoral committee or the presidium of the 
people's congress shall brief the voters or deputies on the personal circumstances of candidates 
for deputy. The political parties, mass organizations, voters or deputies who recommend 
candidates may brief group meetings of voters or deputies about the candidates they are 
recommending.”7  However, the effects of such “group meetings” are limited.  Normally voters 
are only briefed with very basic information of the candidates such as education level, party 
affiliation, employment, awards, etc.  Therefore, voters lack the knowledge of candidates’ skills 
and capacities that are necessary for them to make wise decisions in casting votes.  Since then, 
voters have become further alienated from participating in the elections (Yuan 2003, 224) and 
there have been very few election campaigns.8  For a long time, the word jingxuan (election 
campaign), which is believed to be a feature of the “Western capitalism”, has been a taboo 
among electoral officials and staff.9
In 2003, however, election campaigns were revived during the urban DPC elections in 
Shenzhen and Beijing.  In April and May, 8 citizens in Shenzhen sought candidacies to be 
elected as people’s deputies in the DPC elections.  Most of them reached out to publicize 
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themselves by putting up posters, handing out flyers and name cards, and mailing letters of self-
introduction to local residents.  One of the write-in candidates won the election by a big lead 
over two final candidates. 
Seven months later, during the DPC elections in Beijing, 27 citizens conducted election 
campaigns to be nominated and elected.  In addition to passing out flyers and putting up posters, 
campaigners in Beijing also distributed brochures of election law to voters and posted campaign 
speeches at online discussion boards.  One of the campaigners even set up a 3-member campaign 
office to help him win the election. 
It is interesting to note that many campaigners in Shenzhen and Beijing came from the 
middle class that is newly emerging from the decades of economic reforms of China.  For 
example, at least three campaigners in Shenzhen were homeowners and at least three worked for 
private enterprises as opposed to the Socialist danwei.10  In Beijing, the 26 campaigners were 
college students, university professors, lawyers and businessmen.  At least nine were 
homeowners who wished to represent the interests of homeowners.   
One may wonder if there is a link between the social class of the campaigners and their 
motivations in running for the DPC elections.  If so, considering the fact that the DPC elections 
have been practically ignored by most voters for two decades, what inspired these middle class 
campaigners to run for the elections in 2003?  More importantly, why did they want to run for a 
political position that is largely symbolic in the Chinese political system?  Will the campaign 
activities in 2003 exert any effects on democratic elections in China in the future?  What does the 
Chinese middle class’s campaigning behavior say about the influences of middle class on 
democratization in general?  The rest of this thesis will try to address these issues. 
 
  
 7
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
In order to study the motivations of the middle class members in China to participate in 
local elections, one needs to understand the logic behind the effects of socio-economic changes 
on political development and what role the middle class plays in this process.  In the Chinese 
case in particular, one needs to understand what concerns the Chinese new middle class members 
most and how these concerns affect their decision to participate in politics.  This section will 
review the existing literature on middle class and political development, and the literature on the 
development of the Chinese middle class. 
The relationship between the emergence of middle class and political transformation has 
long been debated in the field of comparative politics.  Lipset once suggested that the larger the 
size of the new middle class, the higher the chance for democracy to flourish (Lipset 1981).  In 
his seminal paper, Lipset hypothesized a causal relationship between high levels of economic 
development and the prevalence of democracy, and explained that rising incomes would mitigate 
class conflicts so that the lower strata could be tolerated (Lipset 1959, 69-105).  Similarly, in 
explaining how various factors brought about by economic development could sustain 
democracy, Huntington stated that since democracy means majority rule, it is “only possible if 
the majority is a relatively satisfied middle class, and not an impoverished majority confronting 
an inordinately wealthy oligarchy” (Huntington 1984, 199). 
The social mobilization theory posits that economic development increases the 
interaction between individuals and states, which, in turn, encourages people to participate in 
political decision-making processes (Shi 1999a, 425-44).  Mobilization theory also posits that 
economic development alters social class structure by expanding the middle class.  As greater 
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portions of the population become educated and wealthy, they will become more interested in 
political decision-making, more sensitive to the political opportunities available, and more active 
in political participation (Nie, Powell and Prewitt 1969, 374).  As Lipset et al. argued, “People 
with more income, in complex and widely interdependent work situations, with more education, 
and more access to health and other services are more likely to ask for increased political 
freedom” (Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993, 166).  These arguments are supported by many cases 
of democratization in the real world.  China’s neighbors, Taiwan and South Korea for example, 
were democratized in the late 1980s partly due to the increasing political demands from the 
fledging middle class in their domestic societies.  
There are alternative views on the relationship between middle class and democratic 
development during the economic development.  For example, Huntington himself once warned 
that the middle class could be anti-democratic when they are threatened by working class 
movements (Huntington 1991, 66).  In her literature review of democratization theories, Eva 
Bellin identified the capitalist class and working class as the two social forces in fostering 
democratic change.  She mentioned that some scholars hold the view that “while capitalists 
supported the introduction of representative government and the protection of civil liberties, they 
opposed the extension of political rights to the lower classes” (Bellin 2000, 176).  Bellin viewed 
both the capitalist class and the working class as “contingent democrats” (Bellin 2000, 179). 
While there are contending views with regard to the middle class’ impact on political 
transformation, in the Chinese case the research on the relationship between new middle class 
and potential Chinese democratization has yet to find any clear correlation.  There is mixed 
evidence whether accumulation of wealth among China’s entrepreneurs has fostered pro-
democratic attitudes.  While some affluent people rely on the state for future prosperity and 
  
 9
appear content with maintaining an authoritarian political system, others have preferred 
competitive politics.  Read, for example, has argued: 
“…business people can be highly dependent on the state in numerous ways for their economic 
success; for instance, for access to capital and relief from extractive predation.  Democratization 
could well harm, rather than promote, their business interests.  Moreover, to achieve their aims 
they often rely on individual clientelistic strategies. … other scholars…pointing to a heightened 
sense of the common beliefs and interests of private business people and in some quarters 
hypothetical support for political competition and an end to the Party’s monopoly on power, but 
with little concrete political action” (Read 2003, 37). 
 
Assuming that establishment of civil society may advance democratization, some 
research has focused on the Chinese middle class’ participation in associational activities and 
examined whether associational life could help develop civil society in China as economic 
interests have multiplied and personal freedom has grown (Gold 1990, 18-31; He 1997; Read 
2003).  Gold argued that with increasing personal control over assets, wealthy people have more 
economic interests and may defend them through collective action, given that there is more 
openness in the realm of social organization and larger personal freedom (Gold 1990, 31).  
Others argued that the newly wealthy “tend to participate in state-mediated associational forms, 
which are sometimes described as corporatist, as opposed to generating the type of autonomous 
groups that could wield real clout” (Read 2003, 36).  Basically, it is doubtful whether the new 
middle class members in China are able to establish a mature civil society that will boost a 
democratic movement. 
In summary, the literature suggest that until now it is questionable whether middle class 
will be a driving factor in democratization and whether the Chinese middle class can wield 
power to promote democracy in China.  Moreover, very little research has systematically 
examined the real political participation by the Chinese new middle class members and 
particularly their participation in local elections, partly due to the lack of such cases.  My 
research seeks to fill this research gap by doing individual-level analysis using motivation data 
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from the actual middle class candidates who ran for the 2003 DPC elections in Shenzhen and 
Beijing. 
As China is undergoing major economic transitions, it is worthwhile to explore whether 
and how the middle class members participate in politics as their way of life has been altered by 
rapid economic changes.  For example, purchasing a private home became possible as the 
housing reform unfolded in the late 1990s and as the middle class members’ income started to 
increase.  Ownership of property, one could argue, potentially provides middle class citizens 
material incentives to get involved in politics. 
Since the CCP took power in 1949, urban housing was owned by governments or by 
work units (danwei), and was allocated to urban residents for free.  Starting from the 1980s, 
China implemented housing reforms to sell existing homes to residents and to build new 
commercial apartment complexes for sale.  It was estimated that nearly five million square 
meters of new homes were constructed each year from 1995 to 1997 (Read 2003, 40). 
Once people purchase private homes in newly built apartment complexes or 
neighborhood (xiaoqu), they are inclined to protect the properties they own and to maintain the 
quality of neighborhood they live in.  To do so, they have to deal with two actors that are 
involved in the apartment complexes.  One is the development companies (kaifa shang) which 
construct commercial homes and are either privately owned or owned by branches of 
governments.  Many development companies make promises to prospective customers such as 
maintaining certain size of grasslands in the apartment complex, installing natural gas, building 
fitness center, etc.  But very often they end up using the proposed budget to construct more 
buildings in the complex or simply break their promises after customers purchase homes.  This 
has been a major reason for the conflicts between homeowners and development companies. 
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The other actor is the property-management companies (wuye guanli gongsi) which 
handle all community affairs such as sanitation, security, parking, grassland maintenance, etc.  
Property-management companies are often owned by development companies or by the housing 
management office of the government.  Very few are privately owned.11  Many management 
companies try to maximize their profits by exacting unreasonable fees from homeowners.  When 
homeowners have problems with their apartments within the warranty period, the management 
companies often ignore them or send them to the development companies. 
As individual homeowners found their property interests unprotected, they formed 
homeowner associations in apartment complexes to defend their economic interests (weiquan12) 
and resist exaction from the management company.  However, since management companies and 
development companies usually have connections with the government, homeowners have often 
been defeated in their battles with them.  There have been many cases where activists of 
homeowner associations were beaten by gangsters employed by development companies and 
management companies. 
Being unable to secure their property interests, the homeowners may consider joining the 
government to protect their economic interests by using public power.  Thus it is a sensible 
decision for them to choose to work for local people’s congress and represent other homeowners 
as people’s deputies so that they can submit bills for local government to consider and suggest to 
formulating or amending laws and regulations to better protect their economic interests.  A 
number of campaigners in the 2003 DPC elections in Shenzhen and Beijing were leaders of 
homeowner associations and they believed that their economic interests could be better protected 
if they are represented in the LPCs.13  This suggests a hypothesis worth investigating.  Hence, 
  
 12
Hypothesis 1: As a new middle class with property emerges, they will be more likely to 
turn to politics if they feel their economic interests are at stake.  A primary motivating 
factor for running for DPC elections is to protect one’s economic interest. 
In addition to economic interests, candidates may run for elections for political reasons.  
For example, according to Nathan’s research, for the campaigners in 1980 to run for the DPC 
elections was an opportunity both to test the potential of the election law amended in 1979 and to 
change the state power through the congress (Nathan 1985, 206).  While it is hardly realistic to 
expect that election to the DPC can seriously challenge state power, it is worth noting that the 
campaigners in 1980 had a keen perception on how the law could be used to challenge state 
authority and help them reach the goal of democratization.  For them, running election 
campaigns based on the law was a “first step toward the realization of socialism democracy” 
(Nathan 1985, 206). 
From the 1980 election we see a strong desire among campaigners to defend their 
political rights after the election law was amended.  Such a desire has reappeared in the past 
decade as people have become more aware of their rights.  In a recent study, for example, 
Minxin Pei found that the Chinese people’s awareness of their rights granted by state laws and 
policies has increased in the 1990s (Pei 2000). 
Pei attributed such rights-consciousness to the legal reforms, socio-economic 
development and a changing international context.  As the level of education increases, citizens 
are more aware of the economic policies, legal reforms, and political system under which they 
are governed.  Moreover, the opening of the state to the international community has enabled the 
citizens to observe and experience the political and legal systems in other countries.  These 
developments have made the Chinese citizens clearer about the rights they hold, and the ones 
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that are not allowed by the Chinese authority.  As a result, they become more willing to defend 
their rights once infringed and more eager to practice rights that were ignored in the past.  
People’s desire to defend their rights implies their rights-consciousness. 
Under the authoritarian government, many rights that are granted to Chinese citizens by 
the Constitution and laws are kept in tight control by the CCP or not allowed to be put into 
practice (Nathan 1986, 161).  For example, although the election law specifies that 10 or more 
voters may collectively nominate preliminary candidates to the LPC deputies elections, the CCP 
often replaces the candidates nominated by voters with those it trusts.14  Similarly, although the 
law allows candidates to meet voters at “voters’ group meetings” organized by the election 
committee, it does not specify whether to allow for election campaigns beyond “group meetings” 
as a way for candidates to interact with voters.  As a result, voters lose their trust in the election 
procedures and they rarely try to nominate candidates conjointly, and candidates barely reach out 
to publicize themselves.  In the 2003 DPC elections, however, some voters regained their 
enthusiasm and assembled to nominate their candidates.  Meanwhile, the candidates, including 
the independent ones, bravely tested the election law by running campaigns to seek ballots from 
the voters.  It implies that the new middle class members have a clearer view of the political 
rights they hold and are ready to defend such rights.  This suggests a plausibility of another 
primary motivating factor for the candidates to run for elections.  Hence, 
Hypothesis 2: The middle class members will participate in politics if they want to defend 
their political rights.  A primary motivating factor for running for DPC elections is one’s 
rights-consciousness. 
Some middle class members may turn to politics both to protect their economic interests 
and to defend their political rights.  In order to protect their property interests by joining the 
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LPCs, the middle class members have to understand the advantages and flaws of the political 
system so that they may assess the possibility of their success in elections.  Once they realize that 
certain political rights are not ensured, they will seek to consolidate them so that they are able to 
win the elections and have their economic interests ensured.  Thus the political rights-
consciousness emerged partly for economic reasons.  For some election campaigners, to be 
elected as a people’s deputy is a means not only for protecting their property rights, but also for 
defending the political rights of being elected in local elections.  It suggests a hypothesis to be 
tested. 
Hypothesis 3: The middle class members will run for DPC elections if they want to 
protect their economic interests and defend their political rights.   
For some middle class members, to become a people’s deputy may be an honor and it 
may be helpful to advance their personal career.  In urban China, the ratio between the number of 
people’s deputies and that of voters is very small.  Normally a people’s deputy represents 
approximately 40,000 voters.  Although a people’s deputy does not possess real political power, 
it still symbolizes an honor to represent a large number of people in the government.  The honor 
may even be aggrandized considering that being a local people’s deputies is an unpaid job and 
people may appreciate his volunteering spirit.  Presumably, some middle class members, 
particularly the business people, will take advantage of the honor of being people’s deputies as a 
way for publicity.  For example, displaying his title of being a people’s deputy on name cards 
and business publicity materials will increase his credibility and strengthen his credentials.  It 
may also indicate his connection with the government and affect others’ view on his capacity to 
achieve business success.  Hence, 
  
 15
Hypothesis 4: The middle class members will run for DPC elections if they want to 
pursue personal honor.   
And, 
Hypothesis 5: The middle class members will run for DPC elections if they want to 
advance their personal careers. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
In order to test the validity of these hypotheses, I will first clarify the meanings of the 
variables described in the hypotheses.  Then I will find sufficient empirical evidence to measure 
the variables and present the evidence by using certain methodology so as to justify the causal 
relations to be examined. 
The term of middle class has various definitions.  I apply and agree with the reference in 
the following description: “People with more income, in complex and widely interdependent 
work situations, with more education, and more access to health and other services are more 
likely to ask for increased political freedom” (Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993, 166).  In this 
thesis I mainly refer to white-collar workers, professionals, technicians, and intellectuals as 
members of the middle class. 
Political rights-consciousness here refers to people’s awareness of political rights ensured 
by the Constitution and law, and more importantly, their willingness to defend such rights.  In 
this thesis, the middle class members’ economic interests are embedded in protection of their 
private properties and other property-related interests.  The change of levels of rights-
consciousness and economic interests will be explained by the discussion of changing social 
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backgrounds in China and will be shown through statements in the interviews of the election 
campaigners. 
This thesis will draw its data from the newspaper and magazine reports on the election 
campaigners.  According to the Carter Center’s China Elections and Governance website15, 
about 125 Chinese articles, including both news report and scholarly studies, were written on the 
2003 Shenzhen DPC elections and campaigns.  About 60 news articles and editorials have been 
dedicated to the campaign activities in Beijing DPC elections, and another 300 news reports 
covering the entire election processes.  The news reports are from the newspapers and magazines 
publishers all over China.  Many of them are not managed by the central government of China or 
are known as reporting more independently and honestly.  In addition, there are dozens of 
Western news reports on both elections in 2003.  Meanwhile, data comes from the campaigners’ 
speeches posted on the Internet discussion boards or quoted by media reports, and their 
interviews with the Chinese media.  Some of the empirical evidence is collected from the articles 
published by the China Elections and Governance website whose managing team sent an 
independent observer to monitor part of the election processes in Beijing.  As most of the data is 
in Chinese, translating the speeches and interviews will facilitate Western understanding of the 
candidates’ motivations in 2003 DPC elections.  The thesis also refers to and discusses some of 
the regulations in the election law of China, which comes from the website of the National 
People’s Congress of China. 
To test the hypotheses, the data is analyzed in this thesis in two steps.  First, I read all 
articles, identify the campaigners (N=34), and code the various motivations of the candidates for 
running for the offices.  Based on this aggregate data, I analyze the results to provide a first-cut 
answer as to which hypotheses are most accurate.  After presenting and evaluating this aggregate 
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data, I conduct a close study of individual election candidates in order to examine in greater 
detail precisely how the motivating factors affected the campaigners and prompted them to run 
for the elections.  As the predictions in the proposed hypotheses are not made by other known 
theories, case studies are the best format to capture evidence that may confirm or disconfirm the 
hypotheses.  Moreover, a successful confirmation of the predictions proposed in the hypotheses 
through case studies may provide necessary backdrops for other people to further trace the causal 
process and to see how a more general theory works (Evera 1997, 54). 
One may argue that the small number of campaigners (N=34) in contrast to the large 
number of voters may affect the validity of hypothesized causal relations.  Moreover, 
considering that there are local people’s congress elections in every city and township of China 
every three or five years, the fact that only two cities were found with campaigning activities 
may further diminish the significance of the candidates’ campaigning behavior.  However, it is 
worth noting that because of the rise of campaigning activities carried out by these 34 candidates, 
the 2003 LPC elections in Shenzhen and Beijing were extensively reported by the Chinese and 
foreign media, and consequently drew extraordinary attention from the public.  Therefore, 
although the number of cases is small, they are more visible than expected in the public eye, thus 
may have greater significance than suggested by their small number. 
 
5. FINDINGS: AGGREGATE DATA 
 
From all relevant articles, I identify the motivations of each of 34 candidates who ran for 
the DPC elections and list them in Table 1.  Then I categorize the various motivating factors and 
identify the candidates who were motivated by each categorized factor (see Table 3).  It turns out 
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that the data support the first three hypotheses while little evidence supports the fourth and the 
fifth hypothesis.  I will do an in-depth analysis on the data to illustrate the correlations. 
 
 
Table 1: Candidates and Their Motivations 
 
No Name Location Occupation Motivation 
1 Maowen Du Beijing Retired Protect the interests of home owners 
2 Fengchen Yang Beijing N/A N/A 
3 Hailiang Nie Beijing Businessman Protect the interests of home owners 
4 Xiazhen Shao Beijing 
Researcher, Chinese 
Academy of Social 
Sciences 
Protect the interests of home owners 
5 Junchao Chen Beijing N/A N/A 
6 Wenbin Zhou Beijing N/A N/A 
7 Ruiqi Wang Beijing N/A Protect the interests of home owners 
8 Liang Ming Beijing College Student Defend the election rights 
9 Yao Yao Beijing College Student Defend the election rights Protect the interests of students 
10 Menglin Li Beijing College Student 
Defend the election rights 
Protect the interests of students 
Improve his social abilities 
11 Min Li Beijing College Student Protect the interests of migrant workers, college students and women 
12 Wenjie Ouyang Beijing College Student Protect the interests of students Advance the Chinese democracy via elections 
13 Jun Yin Beijing College Student 
Advance democratic DPC elections 
Advance the role of people’s deputies 
Advance Chinese democracy and rule of law 
Protect the interests of students and other ruoshi 
qunti (socially weak groups) 
14 Lei Shi Beijing College Student 
Protect the interests of students 
Defend the election rights 
Advance democracy in school 
15 Yuelai Xie Beijing College Student Advance Chinese democracy via elections Defend the election rights 
16 Jia Zhao Beijing College Student Protect the interests of students 
17 Junhao Chen Beijing College Student Defend the election rights Advance democracy in China via elections 
18 Riqiang Chen Beijing College Student Defend the election rights Protect the interests of students 
19 Meng Chen Beijing College Student 
Defend the election rights 
Protect the interests of students and socially weak 
groups 
Develop Haidian District’s economy, 
infrastructure and environment 
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20 Zhaoyong Du Beijing Lawyer 
21 Xingshui Zhang Beijing Lawyer 
Monitor the government 
Advance political reform 
Defend the election rights 
22 Lihua Tong Beijing Lawyer Defend the interest of voters 
23 Zhiyong Xu Beijing Law Professor 
Defend the political right of election 
Advance rule of law 
Advance democratization in China 
Contribute to public affairs 
24 Jinbiao Ge Beijing Law Professor Protect the interests of students Defend the election rights 
25 Kexin Shu Beijing Researcher, Businessman 
Defend political rights by participating in 
elections 
Contribute to public affairs 
Advance democratic self-determination in urban 
communities 
Protect the interests of home owners 
Publicize the election rights and the functions of 
DPCs and people’s deputies 
Advance democracy in China 
26 Hai Wang Beijing Businessman 
Contribute to law-making 
Advance democratic self-determination in urban 
communities 
Advance the functions of people’s deputies 
Set an example for others to participate in 
elections 
Advance both self-interest and others’ interests 
(socially weak groups and home owners) 
Publicize the election rights 
27 Youmei Xiao Shenzhen Accountant Protect the interests of voters Monitor the government 
28 Haining Wu Shenzhen Businessman 
Protect the interests of voters 
Protect the interests of home owners 
Defend the election rights 
29 Jiajian Zou Shenzhen 
Employee of a 
Telecommunication 
Company 
Protect the interests of home owners and socially 
weak groups by participating in law-making 
processes 
Publicize the DPC elections and increase the 
voters’ rights-consciousness 
30 Liang Wang Shenzhen President of a Technical Institute 
Represent the interests of students 
Honor of the school 
Defend the election rights 
31 Bo Xu Shenzhen 
Engineer, Shenzhen 
Urban Infrastructure 
Planning Institute 
Defend the election rights 
32 Yuanbai Ye Shenzhen Insurance Salesman Protect the interests of home owners 
33 Xiaoying Xie Shenzhen N/A Protect the interest of socially weak groups 
34 Shiping Luo Shenzhen 
Deputy Director of 
Road Bureau, Baoan 
District 
N/A 
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Notes: 
1. It was mentioned at many occasions that Fengchen Yang (No. 2), Junchao Chen (No. 5) and Wenbin 
Zhou (No. 6) announced their candidacies as independent candidates.  Although their speeches are not 
available, all reports that mentioned their names indicated that they appeared as homeowners and they 
were listed together with No. 1, 3, 4 and 7.  Therefore, it is reasonable for us to assume that the above 
three candidates were motivated by the demand of protecting private properties. 
2. Shiping Luo (No. 34) was mentioned only once by the media as himself trying to seek the candidacy and 
winning the election.16  But whether he was nominated by the Party or by voters and whether he was an 
independent candidate were not known by us.  His motivations also were not available. 
3. Due to the data constraints, some campaigners’ occupations could not be found. 
 
 
Table 2 shows that, in general, most of the campaigners in Beijing and Shenzhen were 
members of new middle class in China.  It is shown in the data that 68% of the 34 campaigners 
were private business leaders, lawyers, and college students and professors.  9% were white-
collar employees who worked for either state-owned or privately-owned enterprises.  Another 
6% were senior employees in government or government-owned institution.  Their participation 
has given a special meaning to the 2003 DPC elections.   
 
 
Table 2: Occupations of the Campaigners in 2003 DPC Elections 
 
Occupation Number Percentage (N = 34) 
Private Business Leader 4 12% 
Lawyer 3 9% 
College Student 12 35% 
Professor 2 6% 
Academic Researcher 1 3% 
Assistant to Manager; Senior Accountant  1 3% 
Employee of a Telecommunication Company 1 3% 
President of Shenzhen Advanced Technical Institute 1 3% 
Senior Engineer of Shenzhen Urban Infrastructure Planning 
Institute 1 3% 
Insurance Salesman 1 3% 
Deputy Director of Road Bureau, Baoan District of Shenzhen 1 3% 
Retired 1 3% 
N/A 5 15% 
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The data in Table 3 indicates that the following factors have motivated the middle class 
Chinese to seek candidacies or conduct campaigns in the DPC elections in Shenzhen and Beijing 
(see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Candidates’ Motivations 
 
Motivation Specification Name Number Percentage (N = 34) 
Protect the interests of home 
owners 
Maowen Du 
Hailiang Nie 
Xiazhen Shao 
Ruiqi Wang 
Hai Wang 
Kexin Shu 
Haining Wu 
Jiajian Zou 
Yuanbai Ye 
(Fengchen Yang 
Junchao Chen 
Wenbin Zhou)17
12 35% 
Protect the interest of students 
Yao Yao 
Menglin Li 
Min Li 
Wenjie Ouyang 
Jun Yin 
Lei Shi 
Jia Zhao 
Riqiang Chen 
Meng Chen 
Jinbiao Ge 
Liang Wang 
11 32% 
Protect the interests of socially 
weak groups 
Min Li 
Jun Yin 
Meng Chen 
Hai Wang 
Jiajian Zou 
Xiaoying Xie 
6 18% 
Defend the interests of voters 
(in general) 
Lihua Tong 
Youmei Xiao 
Haining Wu 
Hai Wang 
4 12% 
Protect voters interests 
Contribute to public affairs Zhiyong Xu Kexin Shu 2 6% 
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Defend election rights 
Liang Ming 
Yao Yao 
Menglin Li 
Lei Shi 
Yuelai Xie 
Junhao Chen 
Riqiang Chen 
Meng Chen 
Zhaoyong Du 
Xingshui Zhang 
Zhiyong Xu 
Jinbiao Ge 
Kexin Shu 
Haining Wu 
Liang Wang 
Bo Xu 
Jun Yin 
17 50% 
Defend election rights 
Publicize the election rights and 
the functions of DPCs and 
people’s deputies 
Kexin Shu 
Hai Wang 
Jiajian Zou 
Jun Yin 
4 12% 
Advance Chinese democracy 
via elections 
Wenjie Ouyang 
Jun Yin 
Yuelai Xie 
Junhao Chen 
Zhaoyong Du 
Xingshui Zhang 
Zhiyong Xu 
Kexin Shu 
8 24% 
Advance rule of law Jun Yin Zhiyong Xu 2 6% 
Advance democracy in School Lei Shi 1 3% 
Advance Chinese 
democracy 
Advance democratic self-
determination in urban 
communities 
Kexin Shu 
Hai Wang 2 6% 
Advance the role of people’s 
deputies 
Jun Yin 
Hai Wang 2 6% 
Empower the DPCs 
Monitor the government 
Zhaoyong Du 
Xingshui Zhang 
Youmei Xiao 
3 9% 
Advance self-interests  Liang Wang 1 3% 
Collective honor  Meng Chen 1 3% 
Develop regional economy 
and welfare  Menglin Li 1 3% 
Improve personal social 
abilities  Menglin Li 1 3% 
Notes: For a list of candidates and their pledges, please see Table 1. 
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1) Protect the interests of voters.  The empirical data shows that 35% of the 34 
campaigners in the DPC elections of Shenzhen and Beijing were motivated by their 
interests of protecting private property, which supports the first hypothesis.  In urban 
cities of China, conflicts between the homeowners and the developers and property 
management companies have become increasingly severe.  The homeowners often 
find themselves in a disadvantaged situation in striving to protect their property 
interests against the developers and management companies.  At the same time, they 
see the local people’s congresses as a potential political institution through which 
they can secure their economic interests through legislation and through government 
power. 
 
We also noticed that 32% of the campaigners, all of whom were college students and 
faculties, vowed to represent the interests of college students.  18% pledged to protect 
the interests of socially weak groups (ruoshi qunti), and half of these candidates were 
university students.  Finally, 9% and 6% of the candidacy-seekers expressed that they 
were willing to represent the voters’ interests in general and participate in public 
affairs. 
2) Defend election rights.   Among the 34 campaigners, 50% of them publicly stated that 
they hoped to defend the rights of voting and the rights of being elected through their 
participation.  Meanwhile, 9% of them hoped to spread the knowledge of election 
rights among voters via their campaign activities.  Some 19 (56%) campaigners were 
known to carry out campaigning activities to help promote election rights granted by 
the election law.  All these data are supportive of the second hypothesis.  In addition, 
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15% of campaigners promised to empower the DPCs if they were elected.  As most of 
incumbent deputies do not function as they are supposed to, sometimes because they 
are suppressed by the CCP, the campaigners vowed to serve as responsible deputies 
by participating in the law-making process, advancing the functions of people’s 
deputies, and monitoring local governments. 
 
Members of the urban middle class usually know more about the political system and 
legal system of the country as they are better-educated, sometimes wealthier, and 
more open to the outside world.  Accordingly, they are more conscious of political 
rights and are more likely to struggle for rights that are not ensured in reality.  The 
campaigners in the 2003 DPC elections aimed at testing the legal regulations in the 
election law in order to ensure that their election rights are not fake ones. 18 
3) Economic interests and political rights.  Seen from the empirical data, 12% (or 4) 
campaigners, mainly homeowner association leaders, were not only motivated by 
economic interests to run for elections, but also wanted to defend their election rights 
and to empower the DPCs.  In other words, both economic interests and political 
rights-consciousness have collectively made the middle class members in China run 
for the DPC elections, which gives some support to the third hypothesis. 
4) Advance democracy in China.  29% of campaigners hoped to advance democracy, 
rule of law and grassroots self-determination in China and democracy in their 
universities if elected.  This was especially common among the rights-defenders who 
saw the election campaigns as a step to democratization.  The data shows that 42% of 
those who vowed to defend the election law also called for democratization in China.  
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The motivation of democratization was not hypothesized in the thesis but it is not a 
surprising result because presumably the defenders of political rights may want to 
pursue democracy as a broad goal. 
5) Finally, the empirical data does not seem to have strong evidence to support other 
hypothesized causal relations.  There is no indication that any of the campaigners ran 
for DPC elections to gain personal honor.  Neither did anyone express to advance 
his/her career interests by becoming a people’s deputy. 
 
6. INTERVIEW DATA AND NARRATIVES: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSES 
 
 While the statistical data suggests the overall validity of the hypotheses, analyses of 
individual cases of the campaigners will help us examine their motivations more closely.  By 
discussing the campaign speeches and media interviews with the campaigners, the following 
section will show that the campaigners were motivated by their economic interests or political 
rights consciousness or both. 
 
Economic Interests 
 
The cases of Mr. Zou Jiajian from Shenzhen and Mr. Nie Hailian from Beijing may best 
illustrate how economic interests motivated them to run the DPC elections.  As homeowners, 
both of them have had problems with the developers and property management companies of 
their neighborhood communities.  Frustrated by their futile efforts in defending their properties 
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interests, both of them saw people’s deputies as helpful in solving their problems thus decided to 
participate in the DPC elections and become people’s deputies themselves.  
Zou had struggled for a long time with the developer and the management company over 
issues related to his and his neighbors’ apartments before he decided to run for the 2003 DPC 
elections in Shenzhen.  When he purchased an apartment in a high-rise building in 1998, Zou 
was promised by the development company that a brand name elevator, probably made by 
Mitsubishi, would be installed in the building.  Only after he moved in did he find that the 
elevator was made by an unknown manufacturer and, even worse, it sometimes went freefall, 
which frightened Zou and his neighbors.  There were other infrastructure items in the complex 
that failed to meet the promises made by the developer before the residents made the purchase.  
In 2001, Zou led the residents to file a lawsuit against the developer.  They won the case and 
were compensated by the developer.  Later Zou was elected as chairman of the apartment 
complex’s homeowner association.   
Being unsatisfied with the services provided by the property management company and 
fed up by the unacceptable fees, Zou and his association members unprecedentedly fired the 
property management company that was affiliated with the developer, and selected another 
company through an open bid.  In the same year, Zou was defeated in another lawsuit and was 
sentenced to pay 80,000 yuan ($9,756) to the developer who accused Zou for being responsible 
for an online post on the homeowner association’s website written by an unknown member 
containing scandalous words about the developer. 
Then Zou realized that it might be easier to defend the homeowners’ interests by joining 
the DPC and being a people’s deputy.  However, as an employee of a state-owned enterprise, at 
first Zou was afraid that running election campaigns would bring him more trouble.  It was not 
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until a week before the election day in Futian District that Zou decided to run as a “write-in” 
candidate (lingxuan taren19).  He grieved to the journalist that “to fight for the residents’ rights 
single-handedly has been too difficult!”20  He described his life in the past years as being 
intertwined with lawsuits struggling against the developer and the management company at the 
expense of his physical and financial well-being.  Zou believed that to work within the 
government to change rules would be better than directly confronting the developer and the 
management company.21   
Moreover, as homeowner associations appear in China as newly-born organizations, they 
have not been completely incorporated into the Chinese legal system.  For example, Zou’s 
homeowner association once was declined by the court as not being a qualified legal subject to 
initiate a lawsuit when they tried to sue the developer for failing to save enough money for 
maintenance of the apartment complex.  Zou expressly stated that it was the lawsuits in the past 
years in which he was involved to protect the homeowners’ rights that motivated him to run 
campaigns in the District people’s deputy elections.22
Zou said, “If I were elected as a people’s deputy, I would be able to submit bills (to the 
DPC) and to participate in the rule-making process.  I would call for modification of those rules 
and regulations that are unfavored by the homeowners.  I could use the power of public service 
(gongquan) to protect the private rights (siquan23) of the homeowners.”  Since he missed the 
deadline of candidacy nomination, he put up posters on public notice boards in his community or 
beside convenient stores, appealing to voters to vote for him as a “write-in” candidate.  On his 
campaign poster, Zou wrote, “Please cast your critical vote for a candidate who is courageous to 
represent the homeowners to protect their rights.”24   
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In the second case, Mr. Nie Hailiang, 1,200 miles away from where Zou lived, was 
motivated by similar reasons to carry out election campaigns in Beijing District-level people’s 
congress elections in December 2003. 
Three years previous to the election, the prospective homebuyers of Huilongguan 
neighborhood were told by the development company that they would have a playground and 
grassland on a 10,000-square-meter land in the neighborhood.  Since then, however, nothing was 
constructed and in September 2003, the residents received a notice from the local government 
that the deserted land would be used to build new apartments for the Department of Public 
Transportation of the Beijing Municipal Government (BMG).  The homeowners in Huilongguan 
neighborhood were infuriated as their interests were sacrificed by the development company.   
On September 14, they went to the BMG and submitted their petition.  The government 
set up an investigation team but did not come up with any solution.  On October 18, some 
homeowners were beaten by the construction workers on the land after some oral disputes.  
Believing it was an intended action by the development company, some 400 homeowners drove 
over 100 cars to the BMG to petition officials there in the evening.  Nie was one of the five 
homeowner representatives who were able to meet with the officials of Changping District 
Government and the developer after the petition.  By the time the elections in Beijing were held, 
the land had been deserted.  Since Nie became well-known among the residents for doing 
tremendous work in defending the homeowners’ rights in the past three months, he was 
nominated by the residents as a people’s deputy candidate.25
With respect to his participation in the election, Nie confessed that since 1998 when 
purchasing private homes became possible, people’s interests are more embedded in their assets.  
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Once people are satisfied with their “basic living conditions on clothes and food”, they will have 
“time and money” to “pursue their rights.”26   
In an interview with a magazine, Nie said, “I represent the interests of those who have 
private assets and of the elites of middle- and small-sized businesses…I would like to improve 
the humanity and social conditions within the neighborhood, to resolve the conflicts between 
development companies and homeowners through legislation, and to protect the interests of 
business leaders.”27
Two other candidacy-seekers, Mr. Du Maowen and Mr. Yang Fengchen were from the 
same neighborhood as Nie and were also activists in negotiating with the developer and the local 
government.  Du strongly believed that having a people’s deputy representing home owners’ 
interests would have made it easier for them to deal with the conflicts with the developer.  This 
belief motivated him to run for the elections in Changping District.  Reviewing the difficulties in 
defending their economic interests, Du regretted that the homeowners had no idea who their 
representatives in the government were or where they were.28  A retired person in his 60s, Du 
sighed, “What if we had a people’s deputy to have our voice heard in the government!”29  He 
said, “The repeated failure in defending the homeowners’ rights (weiquan) was the most 
important motivation for me to work within the (political) system to defend our rights.”  Du 
wanted to represent the homeowners and protect their interests if he were elected.  “I run for a 
people’s deputy because I am a homeowner and I love this community that makes me  both 
happy and sorrowful.  I deeply understand the difficulties of homeowners and I want to try my 
best to protect the rights and interests (quanyi) of every homeowner.”30  Du pledged to establish 
an office to receive voters and their suggestions if elected. 
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In order to make sure that at least one representative of homeowners was elected, later Du 
and Yang withdrew from the election and supported Nie’s campaigns.  The strategy worked, and 
Nie won the election. 
 
 
Rights-Consciousness 
 
While homeowners desired to protect their economic interests by joining the DPCs, 
others (i.e., college students, professors and lawyers) (56% in total) intended to claim their rights 
to run for office and to spread the knowledge of election rights among other voters by carrying 
out campaigning activities. 
Wang Hai, for example, explicitly expressed that his election campaigns were meant to 
tell the Chinese citizens that they should be aware of their (election) rights and know how to 
defend them.  “Many Chinese people are not aware of their rights to vote or to be elected.  Even 
though they know, they do not use their rights.  By participating in the elections, I will prove that 
China is a democratic country with rule of law.”31  Wang is well known in China for his 
persistent efforts to defend consumers’ rights by intentionally purchasing fake and problematic 
products, getting them returned and asking for compensations (Da Jia).32  His efforts were 
believed to have helped Chinese consumers acknowledge that they are protected by the “Law of 
Consumers Rights Protection (Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa).”33  Similarly, Wang believed that it 
would help spread the knowledge of election law among voters if a celebrity ran for office and 
generated publicity about the DPC elections.  He told the journalists several times, “Through 
media I would like to tell people that they should know and use their rights!”34  Wang viewed the 
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result of the election as not important as the fact of his participation.  “If I were elected, I could 
set an example for other campaigners.  If I failed, I could learn a lesson to do better next time.”35
Another campaigner, Shu Kexin, chairman of the homeowner association in his 
neighborhood, claimed that his campaign efforts were meant to tell people that “the rights to vote 
and to be elected are granted by the election law, and voters have the legitimacy to participate in 
elections.”36  Shu had a campaign team with two college students as his assistants.  The team 
designed a poster for Shu and purchased 500 brochures of the election law to deliver to the 
voters.37  In order to make the voters familiar with Shu and with the functions of people’s 
deputy, the team set up the Shu Kexin’s Election Office (Shu Kexin xuanju shiwu bangongshi) 
and called for people to bring their questions before the nomination process started.38  Shu also 
visited the residents’ houses to introduce himself by saying, “Weigh your decision carefully.  
Then vote.”39
Like Wang Hai, Shu candidly confessed, “I do not have high expectations for being 
elected.  Even if I were elected, how much influence would I be able to yield as one of the 400 
deputies?  I only hope to tell people through my efforts that we have rights to participate in 
elections.”40  Shu believed that the emergence of election campaigns by other candidates in 
Beijing’s DPC elections was partly attributed to himself.41
Shu thought that China has democracy and a good legal system but people need to defend 
their rights granted by the law.  “China has a rather sound legal system but the law is somehow 
covered up.”  Challenged by a British journalist that elections are predetermined in China, Shu 
responded, “It is not pre-determined.  I myself am a self-motivated candidate.  It is not that we 
do not have democracy.  It is that nobody strives for democracy.”42  His assistant, Zhu Sihao, a 
college student of Communication University of China, agreed, “The Election Law and People’s 
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Deputy Law are implementable.  Through election campaigns we want to tell people that the 
laws are not abstract legal regulations, and we are exploring a realistic way to exercise the right 
of being elected.”43
In fact, Shu and Wang were not only motivated by their rights-consciousness to run for 
the DPC elections, they also aimed at protecting the economic interests of the homeowners in 
their neighborhoods.  Both Shu Kexin and Wang Hai have been activists of defending the 
homeowners’ interests in their neighborhoods.44  They met each other at a conference of 
homeowners associations in 2000 and decided to form a “Team of Defending Rights” (weiquan 
xiaozu) with a lawyer named Qin Bing, who has been well known among the homeowners in 
Beijing for filing law suits against development companies and property management companies 
in defending the interests of homeowners.45  When the three learned the DPC elections to be held 
in Beijing, they decided to seek candidacies and run campaigns.46  Shu vowed to establish his 
“Office of People’s Deputy” if elected so that he could “strengthen the communication with 
homeowners and better serve their interests.”47  Wang Hai told the journalist that if he were 
elected, he would “try to push for democratic management of urban neighborhoods” and 
“improve legal regulations to better protect the homeowners’ interests.”48
As shown in Wang and Shu’s cases, the motivations of economic interests and rights-
consciousness co-vary with each other in election campaigns.  Since many of those who can 
afford private homes are well-educated and have a better understanding of the political rights, 
they ran for elections to defend both the election rights and the economic interests. 
The student campaigners were also very explicit in defending the political rights by 
running for the DPC elections.  I will discuss the cases of Yin Jun from Beijing University 
(Beida) and Yao Yao from Beijing University of Governance and Law (BUGL). 
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Yin, a second-year graduate student, was nominated by student voters of Beida but did 
not enter the second phase as a final candidate.  Yin decided to run for the election as an 
independent candidate.  On the university’s BBS49, Yin explicitly stated, “The No. 1 purpose of 
my election campaign was to make the DPC elections more democratic (and more scientific) and 
to encourage more voters to cast their votes.”50  Yin pointed out that many voters did not even 
know there were elections, some electoral staff were not familiar with the election procedures, 
and voters were not enthusiastic toward the elections because they did not know of the 
candidates and they were not aware of the functions of the DPC.  Yin asserted that the reason 
why the voters lacked enthusiasm was that there were no election campaigns.   
As an independent candidate, he denounced the formal candidates for not doing anything 
to publicize themselves and interact with the voters.  He said, “An important purpose of my 
election campaigns was to give a hard time to those formal candidates who had not expected 
themselves to be nominated and who did not expect to conduct campaigns to interact with 
voters.”51  Once asked to stop his campaigns by a school senior leader, he responded that he 
would stop under the conditions that either he won the election through campaigns or more than 
half formal candidates ran election campaigns.  “I am not afraid of pressure.  I am afraid of 
indifference (lengmo).”52
In another case, Yao Yao, a college student of Beijing University of Governance and Law 
ranked the defense of election rights as his first motivation to run election campaigns.53  Yao 
Yao said in his speech, “As a student majoring in law, it is almost a habit to be conscious of 
rights.  Thus when I heard of the elections to be held in Changping District, I decided to 
participate in the election.  I will not only implement my rights to elect other people, but also 
implement my rights to be elected.”54   
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In their speeches, both Yao and Yin also made commitments to protect the interests of 
college students if they were elected as a people’s deputy.  However, they did not offer solid 
solutions to reach their goals.  Nor did they give satisfactory answers to the questions raised by 
voters on how they would fulfill their promises.  For example, Yin was asked, “How do you 
think you could serve as a five-year people’s deputy for Beida while you are graduating in a 
year?” In response, Yin warded off the question by saying, “I do not think that is my problem.  
Nobody could ensure that he would stay in the same precinct all the time.  In addition, I hope to 
stay at Beida for my PhD study if I were elected.”55  Neither did Yin offer any specific 
suggestion as to how he would fulfill his commitments on adding civil education to middle 
school and primary school students and strengthening civil rights among Chinese citizens.56   
Indeed, Yin and Yao were similar to other campaigners in seeing their actions more as a 
means to defend election rights.  Although they all made commitments to solve everyday 
problems that concern the voters in their precincts, they did not seem to have a clear idea as to 
how they would achieve their goals as a people’s deputy.  For example, Professor Xu Zhiyong 
from the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunication (BUPT) said in his speech, “I do 
not campaign for my personal interests.  I just wanted to tell people: please trust our law…please 
believe that we have real election rights, and we need to cherish our democratic rights and treat 
our law sincerely.”57  However, when asked what he would do if he were elected, he seemed to 
be vague.  “I am not very familiar with the detailed working procedures of the people’s 
congresses…Five years is a long time, and I do not have any plan at this point…but I will 
certainly submit bills…and I will try to push for the rule of law and democracy by participating 
in the congress meetings.”58  The candidates’ repeated references to election rights and 
democratization have made the voters doubt their capability of solving realistic problems. 
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Some campaigners promised to empower local people’s congresses in monitoring the 
behavior of local governments and be accountable and obligated if elected as people’s deputies.  
This indicates that people become aware of the responsibilities that were supposed to be 
undertaken by people’s deputies according to the People’s Deputies Law but had been neglected 
in the past.  These campaigners hoped to defend the rights granted to people’s deputies by law 
and serve as responsible deputies to counterbalance the monolithic power of state authority. 
Zhang Xingshui and Du Zhaoyong said in their campaign speech, “We have noticed that, 
when making public policies and market economic rules, the power of the government is not 
effectively inquired and monitored, thus the decision-making to a great extent overlooks the 
feedback from the public opinion.  This motivates us to stand out and conduct campaigns in the 
Beijing DPCs elections, for the people’s deputies are spokesmen of the public, which is 
stipulated by the Constitution.”59  Du and Zhang pointed out that many deputies were entitled to 
represent the people but were not doing their job (zai qi wei, bu mou qi zheng).  Thus they 
wished to become full-time deputies because otherwise “we could not devote enough efforts to 
be a qualified deputy”.60
Similarly, Wang Hai argued, “People’s deputies play an important role!  The Constitution 
delegates honorable power to people’s deputies, but many deputies do not fulfill their 
responsibilities…For some deputies, the title is just a rubber stamp and wields no real power.”  
Wang believes that people’s deputies could be more useful.61
Lastly, none of the cases explicitly shows that the campaigners would run for the 
elections for reasons such as fame, honor and career interests.  Even though such interests may 
have motivated the campaigners, perhaps they would not say so in the public.  Based on the data 
used in this study, however, there is very little evidence supporting Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
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Advancing Democratization 
 
Among those who advocated the election rights granted by the law, many also sought to 
advance Chinese democratization by joining the people’s congresses.  Some campaigners 
believed that the campaigning action itself symbolized and promoted a democratic way of 
political participation.  Moreover, once elected, they hoped to serve as responsible people’s 
deputies and apply the rights of people’s deputies granted by the Constitution and law so that the 
LPCs could represent the interests of Chinese people to wield political power.  The campaigners 
believed that these plans, if realized, would pave the way for democratization in China. 
Campaigner Xu Zhiyong, a professor of Beijing University of Postal and 
Telecommunication, believed that democratization is not an “empty word” (konghua) or a 
“penthouse” (kongzhong louge).  It needs detailed contents and needs people to participate.  He 
said, “To exercise our election rights within the limits of law is a means to construct our 
democracy.”62  Xu argued that although elections by themselves might not advance 
democratization, the processes of participation and campaigns would help people see the “hope” 
for eventual democracy.63   
Yin Jun believed that his campaign behavior was meant to “pave the way for 
democratization of his school and his country”, and to “kindle the light for the future of his 
school and his country.”64  Du Zhaoyong and Zhang Xingshui were even more idealistic in the 
view of the elections.  They believed that “nobody could prevent the elites among the 
contemporary Chinese citizens from becoming glorious people like Hamilton and Madison.  Let 
the Haidian District be our Virginia!”65
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In comparison, Shu Kexin and Wang Hai predicted that if they were able to win the 
elections and become people’s deputies, they would as least try to advance the grassroots-level 
democracy in urban communities.  Shu said, “(If I were elected) I would push forward the self-
governance of the homeowners in urban communities.”  “With the institutions for management 
established, the homeowners need to learn to protect their property rights and learn 
democracy.”66  After knowing that he was not elected, he said, “I hoped to give a try for our 
democratic development.  And I wish that more people who are more capable than me will 
participate in the elections next time.”67  Wang Hai said, “If I were elected, I would first forge 
ahead the democratic management in urban communities.  I believe that the self-governance of 
homeowners will bring ahead the Chinese democratization.”68
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to explain what factors have motivated the urban middle class 
members in Shenzhen and Beijing to run for the DPC elections in 2003.  By dissecting the 
campaign activities, speeches, and interviews of the campaigners, I found mixed motivating 
factors which generally support the hypothesized arguments.  Some middle class members in 
Shenzhen and Beijing ran for the DPC elections to advance their economic interests of protecting 
private property.  Some wanted to defend their election rights granted by law and test whether 
these rights are real ones by running for the DPC elections.  Some others were motivated by both 
economic interests and political-rights consciousness to run for the DPC elections.  Although the 
LPCs only play a nominal role at this moment in Chinese politics, the campaigners were 
seriously motivated to strive for a chance to protect their private property through the LPC.  In 
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addition, the study shows that many campaigners wished to change the current status quo in 
Chinese politics by empowering the LPCs if they were elected, and such political goals also 
justified their efforts to run for people’s deputies. 
The results and data presented in this study also have implications for the larger question 
of democratization in China and the middle class’s roles in the democratization process.   There 
are two reasons why the 2003 elections may open a way for the democratic development in 
China. 
First, the initiation of competitive elections by the campaigners in 2003 may help to 
legitimize democratic election procedures, such as popular nomination, transparent 
determination of final candidates, and free and fair campaigns in future DPC elections and other 
grassroots-level elections.  Since the voters watched campaign behaviors by the candidates in 
2003 and became more familiar with the election law, over time they may deem campaigning 
behaviors as legitimate and expect similar activities in future elections.  If such behaviors are 
suppressed, voters may demand institutional changes to render more democratic and competitive 
DPC elections.  The demand will become more imperative if the democratic elections of 
people’s deputies eventually empower local people’s congress and chip away the monopoly of 
power by the CCP. 
The development of village committee elections in China may help us understand how 
democratic election procedures can be legitimated and consolidated through practices and the 
potential relevance of recent LPC elections.  Since its initiation in 1987, village elections were 
incrementally implemented in China by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) officials who are in 
charge (Shi 1999c).  At the early stage, the MCA reformers did not push hard to implement 
absolutely democratic election procedures in villages as the local officials were strongly opposed 
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to village election reforms and often manipulated such elections.  Once peasants started to 
benefit from the competitive elections, they complained about election fraud in the mid-1990s 
and would not allow any election manipulation.  As observed by Wang Zhenyao, the MCA 
official who was in charge of the village elections at that time, “The peasants cared less about the 
bad deeds of corrupt officials and more about the way they were elected” (Liu 2001, 4).  By such 
means, “the MCA could rely on the rural populace to monitor the behavior of local bureaucrats” 
(Shi 1999c, 404).  Eventually it was easier for the MCA officials to consolidate the democratic 
election procedures in rural villages. 
Although the function of the urban DPCs differs from that of the village committees, the 
democratic and competitive elections of the DPCs may be consolidated in a similar way.  Once 
voters are more aware of the election law and willing to defend political rights, they will not 
accept the CCP continuing to deny the granted electoral rights and to manipulate the elections.  
Gradually, institutional change of DPC elections will be demanded by voters to better serve their 
goals, either economic or political.  However, whether the democratic changes of local election 
would by any chance lead to democracy in China remains to be seen.69
Second, the study reveals that the campaigners in the 2003 DPC elections learned to 
apply the rights granted by the state law in confronting the monopoly control of the CCP.  Thus a 
threat may have appeared to the Chinese authoritative government as it might face more 
legalistic collective resistance from the people in the future and may have to reform the election 
system sooner or later to bridge the gap between what is promised by the law and what takes 
place in reality. 
As discussed before, the power of people’s congress and the rights of voters are granted 
and ensured by the Constitution and the election law.  However, such power and rights have long 
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been suppressed by the CCP.  It is worth noting that for some middle class members, the election 
campaigns served as a way to resist the monopoly control of the DPCs by the CCP.  For 
example, Wang Hai argued that the people’s congress needs to be where the citizens exert their 
power, “Our country does not have a institutional system of ‘submitting suggestions’ (najian).  
Only if a system of ‘submitting suggestions’ is established could the civil society play its role 
and citizens could be the owner of the country.”70  The CCP may feel threatened when it faces 
the confrontation from citizens who want to take grip over the power of people’s congresses.  
The potential threat to CCP control is even more critical considering that the campaigners are 
now equipped with the law.  If the CCP continues to manipulate elections and deny certain 
granted electoral rights, it may face legal suits by voters.  One of the lawyers who planned to 
participate in the 2003 DPC elections in Beijing said that he would sue the CCP-controlled 
election committee if it eliminated him as a preliminary nominee without giving a reasonable 
excuse.71
Although at this moment the capacity of the middle class members in making political 
changes in China remains to be seen72, people’s willingness to defend their rights by legalistic 
means and their heightened sense of rights-consciousness may have effective power in 
challenging and resisting the state.  Kevin O’Brien acknowledged that the Chinese villagers have 
learned to use “laws, policies, and other officially promoted values” to “apply pressure on those 
in power who have failed to live up to some professed ideal or who have not implemented some 
beneficial measure” (O’Brien 1996, 41).  He illustrated that the discontented villagers in rural 
China have learned to cite laws and policies like the regulations limiting “farmer’s burdens” to 
ward off unapproved fees or demands for grain that exceed the agreed amount (O’Brien 1996, 
33).  While some research has examined the Chinese farmers’ collective and legalistic action 
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against the bullying rules and policies of local cadres, there is still very little research on the 
changing ways of how urban middle class members collectively counteract the state authority by 
using laws.  This thesis has provided empirical evidence to display such trend. 
In conclusion, this thesis reveals the important roles played by the Chinese middle class 
in initiating the campaigning activities and making the elections more competitive.  It supports 
the argument that the middle class is willing to participate in politics when its members are 
wealthier and more educated.  Such willingness is even stronger when the middle class 
members’ property interests are not securely protected and when the granted political rights are 
not warranted, as displayed by the middle class campaigners in China.  Furthermore, the thesis 
suggests that the middle class’s political participation and its demand for democracy may have a 
positive effect in spreading the democratic norms among the public and may eventually break 
down the authoritarian control of the CCP.  As a result, democratization is possible with the 
middle class’s participation as a leading force.  Such finding may shed light on the theoretical 
argument that the emergence of middle class under economic development will contribute to a 
state’s democratization process. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1 Article 2, “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted on December 4, 1982)”, 
Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-08/27/content_1047764.htm. 
 
2 Article 2, “Law of the People's Republic of China on deputies to the National People's 
Congress and to the Local People's Congresses at various levels”, China Elections & 
Governance (http://www.chinaelections.org).  
 
3 O’Brien explained that the Chinese people’s deputies implement the tasks assigned by the state 
and “deny conflicts of interest both within society and between state and society,” rather than 
making real policy changes that are requested by voters. 
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4 There are four levels of people’s congresses in China, each corresponding to a level of 
government bureaucracy.  The lowest level is the town/township people’s congress in rural areas 
whose deputies are directly elected by voters.  Voters are also allowed to directly elect deputies 
of county-level congresses in rural areas and those of district-level congresses and county-level 
city congresses in urban areas.  These deputies, on behalf of the voters of the same level and 
below, elect the deputies to provincial-level and municipal-level people’s congresses.  Finally, 
the National People’s Congress deputies are elected by deputies to the provincial-level and 
municipal-level people’s congresses.  County (District) -level people’s congresses and below are 
considered as local people’s congresses. 
 
5 The election law here refers to “The Electoral Law of National People’s Congress and Local 
People’s Congresses of the People’s Republic of China (3rd amendment in 1995)”, translated by 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), China Elections and Governance 
(http://www.chinaelections.org). 
 
6 See John Burns, “The People’s Republic of China at 50: National People Reform”, The China 
Quarterly, Vol. 159, No. 3 (1999), pp. 580-94; Jian Chen and Yang Zhong, “Why Do People 
Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in China?” The Journal of Politics Vol. 64, No. 1 (2002), pp. 
178-97; Barrett L. McCormick, “China’s Leninist Parliament and Public Sphere: A Comparative 
Analysis”, in Barrett L. McCormick and Jonathan Unger (eds), China after Socialism: In the 
Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia? (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 29-53; 
Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985); Kevin 
O’Brien, Reform without Liberalization: China’s National People’s Congress and the Politics of 
Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kevin O’Brien, “Agents 
and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies”, The China 
Quarterly Vol. 138 (June 1994), pp. 359-80; Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Tianjian Shi, “Voting and Nonvoting in 
China: Voting Behavior in Plebiscitary and Limited-Choice Elections”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 
61, No. 4 (1999), pp. 1115-39. 
 
7 “The Electoral Law” (fn. 5), Article 33.   
 
8 In September 1998, three political dissidents of the China Democracy Party (CDP) announced 
candidacy for the elections of Chaoyang District People’s Congress in Beijing.  The CDP was 
founded in June 1998 by long-standing political dissidents who kept close ties with political 
exiles overseas and human rights groups in Hong Kong.  The Party recruited about 200 members 
across the country within four months, but was cracked down by the CCP in December 1998.  
See James Conachy, “China Democracy Party Members Face Political Trials.” World Socialist 
Web Site (http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/aug1999/cdp-a14.shtml) (August 14, 1999); 
Minxin Pei, “Rights and Resistance: The Changing Contexts of the Dissident Movement”, in 
Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (eds), Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance 
(London: Routledge, 2000), p. 28. 
 
9 Interview with Yuan Dayi, Professor of Politics at Beijing Governance Administration College, 
Aug. 2003. 
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10 Danwei, or work unit, refers to where people were employed under the Socialist China.  It 
covers every job available to the Chinese people.  Before the setout of market economy, most 
Chinese people were included in the Communist-controlled danwei system which not only 
provides jobs for employees, but also social welfares such as housing, health care, pension, etc.  
The system gradually collapsed after the market economy started in the early 1990s when the 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were reformed and private enterprises emerged.  With more 
and more people employed by private enterprises, the CCP’s direct control has been diminished.  
For the evolution of the danwei system in China, see Xiaobo Lü and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds), 
Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997). 
 
11 Hao Xiaoyao, Lü Fuming and Wang Yuanyuan, “Wuye ni bei shei paoqi?” (Property-
management Companies: Who Abandoned You?) Xinhua News Agency, April 25, 2004. 
 
12 Weiquan means to defend one’s rights.  Activists of homeowners would like to call themselves 
weiquanzhe (rights-defenders).  They believe that to protect property interests and to make 
development companies realize their promises are part of the rights they hold once they purchase 
the assets, and they believe that by protecting their property interests, they are indeed defending 
their rights.  Therefore, rights-consciousness has already been embedded in the homeowners’ 
mind. 
 
13 For a detailed discussion of urban community development, housing reforms, and homeowner 
associations’ weiquan activities in China, see Read 2003; Benjamin Read, “Revitalizing the 
State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’ ”, The China Quarterly, Issue 163 (Sept. 2000), pp. 806-20. 
 
14 Article 29 of the election law states, “Political parties and people's organizations may either 
jointly or separately recommend candidates for deputies. A joint group of at least ten voters or 
deputies may also recommend candidates.”  However, Article 31 stipulates the determination of 
final candidates as follows, “The election committee shall collect and publish, 15 days prior to 
the date of election, the list of nominees for deputies for repeated deliberation, discussion and 
consultation by voter groups in the respective electoral districts and shall decide, in accordance 
with the opinion of the majority of voters, upon a formal list of candidates to be made public five 
days prior to the date of election.”  See “The Electoral Law” (fn. 5).  The “deliberation” and 
“discussion and consultation” processes are briefly called “yunniang” (fermentation) in Chinese, 
and in reality are manipulated by the CCP so that certain nominees are removed while 
“qualified” candidates are selected.  For a story on how a preliminary candidate was removed in 
an electoral precinct in Beijing in 2003, see Yuan Dayi, “Wo shi ruhe bei ‘xieshang’ xialai de 
(How was I Removed by ‘Fermentation’)”, Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China Newsweek), 
December 8, 2003. 
 
15 China Elections and Governance (www.chinaelections.org) is a website produced by The 
Carter Center, focusing on political and social issues in China.  It has a fairly complete collection 
of the media reports on the 2003 DPC elections in Shenzhen and Beijing.  I am one of the 
founders of the website and have been volunteering as assistant Chief Editor of the site. 
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16 Shen Lutao, Wu Huanqing and Li Nanling, “Piaoxiang li tiaochulai de renda daibiao – Wang 
Liang dangxuan renda daibiao huifang (People’s deputies jumping out of ballots – review of 
Liang Wang’s winning the election)”, Xinhua News Agency, June 6, 2003. 
 
17 See Note 1 of Table 1. 
 
18 Article 3 of the election law stipulates that any Chinese citizen over 18 years old, regardless of 
his nationality, race, gender, occupation, family background, religion, education, financial 
condition and duration of residence, has the right to vote and to be elected.  “The Electoral Law” 
(fn. 5).  
 
19 Lingxuan taren literally means “voting for another person.” 
 
20 Fan Qing. “Zou Jiajian: yezhu wenzheng (Zou Jiajian: Homeowner Participating in Politics)”, 
Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolitan Daily), Jan 5, 2004. 
 
21 Li Guiru. “Shenzhen renda daibiao jingxuan muhou (Background of DPC Elections in 
Shenzhen)”, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), May 28, 2003. 
 
22 “Shenzhen shouci chuxian renda ‘duli jingxuanren’ (Independent Candidate First Appeared in 
Shenzhen District Congress Elections)”, Wen Wei Po, May 18, 2003. 
 
23 Gongquan literally means public power while siquan means private rights. 
 
24 Liu Juntong and Li Tianjun. “Shenzhen yi xuanmin zijian jingxuan renda daibiao, yinzhi wushi 
fen haibao la xuanpiao (A Voter Campaigned in District Congress Elections in Shenzhen; 50 
Posters Printed to Attract Voters)”, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), May 17, 
2003. 
 
25 Li Jianmin, “Nie Hailiang: you hengchan zhe you hengxin (Nie Hailiang: Those Who Have 
Private Assets Have Strong Will)”, Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China Newsweek), Issue 47, 
2003. 
 
26 Ibid.  Here the “rights” Nie refereed to implied political rights that could be used to protect 
their property rights. 
 
27 Wu Peishuang, “ ‘Beijing Xianxiang’ de linglei jiedu – rang renda daibiao chengwei zhengzhi 
jia (Alternative Explanation of ‘Beijing Phenomenon” – Let the People’s Deputies be 
Politicians)”, Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China Newsweek), Issue 48, 2003. 
 
28 Wan Xingya, “Beijing liu yezhu jingxuan renda daibiao de taiqian muhou (The Fronts and 
Backgrounds of the Six Homeowners in Beijing Who Sought Candidacies to People’s 
Deputies)”, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), November 20, 2003. 
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29 Ibid. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Wang Ru. “Zijian houxuanren tan xuanju (Self-nominated Candidates Discussing Elections)”, 
China Elections and Governance (www.chinaelections.org), December 5, 2003. 
 
32 Article 48 of Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa (Law of Consumers Rights Protection) states that, 
when a purchased product is determined by relevant government offices to have quality 
problems, upon the request of consumer, the sellers or manufactures are responsible to refund the 
consumer.  Zhongguo Renda Wang (Website of the National People’s Congress of China; 
http://www.npc.gov.cn). 
 
33 “Shu Kexin xiansheng yu Beida tongxue duihua (Mr. Shu Kexin Talking with Students of 
Peking University”, China Elections and Governance (www.chinaelections.org), November 18, 
2003.  
 
34 Wang (fn. 31). 
 
35 “Sanrenxing, zijian canxuan renda daibiao (Three People Running Together: Self-nomination 
in People’s Deputy Elections)”, Zhongguo Shehui Bao (China Society), Oct.25, 2003. 
 
36 Fn. 33. 
 
37 Miao Wei, “Shu Kexin de jingxuan biaoyan (The Campaigning Performance by Shu Kexin)”, 
Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan (Sanlian Life Weekly), Vol. 265, November 24, 2003. 
 
38 Wan Xingya, “Wei canxuan renda daibiao, Beijing yi shimin chengli xuanju shiwu bangongshi 
(A Beijing Citizen Set Up an Election Affairs Office to Campaign for People’s Deputy 
Elections)”, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), September 26, 2003. 
 
39 Mark Magnier, “China Moves Toward an Open Vote”, Los Angeles Times, December 5, 2003. 
 
40 Fn. 38. 
 
41 Fn. 33. 
 
42 Fn. 33.  Ironically, Shu was eliminated during the “fermentation” process and failed to become 
a final candidate in his precinct. 
 
43 Fn. 38. 
 
44 Shu is a part-time researcher at the Center of Institutional Analysis and Public Policy of 
Renmin University (People’s University), and has been doing research on urban community 
democratic management.  Wang is also on the research team at the Center.  Wang has 
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contributed to the making and modification of Regulations on Property Management in Beijing, 
Tianjin and Shanghai.  See Wang Xiaofei, “ ‘Renda daibiao’ Wang Hai? (Wang Hai, a People’s 
Deputy?)”, Nanfang Zhoumo (Nanfang Weekend), November 6, 2003; Hu Kui, Wu Peishuang 
and Zhang Lan, “Shu Kexin de geren jingxuan zhi lu (The Road of Shu Kexin’s Election 
Campaigns)”, Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China Newsweek), Issue 40, November 3, 2003. 
 
45 Ibid.  Hu Kui et al. 
 
46 Qin quit before the nomination started.  He was pressured by the law firm he worked for not to 
seek candidacy, otherwise he would be fired.  He quit both the election and the job.  Interview 
with Qin Bing, November 2003. 
 
47 Fn. 35. 
 
48 Shi Xiaoliang and Wu Wenkai, “ ‘Diaomin’ Wang Hai: woyao dang renda daibiao 
(Censorious Wang Hai: I Want to be a People’s Deputy)”, Qi Lu Zhoukan (Qi Lu Weekly), Nov. 
14, 2003.  Wang once authored a bestseller, “I am a Censorious Citizen.” 
 
49 BBS means Bulletin Board System, a type of online forum widely used in Chinese 
universities.  Most campaign activities of student voters, such as posting campaign speeches and 
answering voters’ questions, were carried out on the school BBS. 
 
50 Yin Jun, “Zhi gewei chubu houxuanren de gongkaixin (A Public Letter to All Preliminary 
Candidates)”, Beida Weiming BBS Zhan (The BBS of “Unknown” of Beijing University; 
http://bbs.pku.edu.cn). 
 
51 “Zijian houxuanren yu xuezi ‘mian dui mian’ (Face to face between candidacy-seekers and 
students)”, Beida Weimin BBS Zhan (The BBS of “Unknown” of Peking University; 
http://bbs.pku.edu.cn).  Other nominees were mostly staff and professors of Peking University 
who were nominated and determined by the election committee or the CCP branch in the school. 
 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 It is worth mentioning that Yao Yao’s father, Yao Lifa is a famous rights-defender in China.  
He ran for county-level people’s deputy as an independent candidate for three times in Qianjiang 
city of Hubei province before finally winning in 1998.  He painstakingly fulfilled his 
responsibility as a people’s deputy and made numerous achievements.  The most famous one is 
that he exposed that 187 democratically elected village chairs were “fired” by town/township 
governments.  See Elizabeth Rosenthal, “Far from Beijing, a Semblance of Democracy,” New 
York Times, March 8, 2002.  In the October 2003 county-level people’s congress elections in 
Qianjiang, 33 voters followed Yao to run for the elections as independent candidates.  Liu 
Zhiming, “Qianjiang zhi xing (Qianjiang Wakening)”, Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China 
Newsweek), Iss. 47, 2003.  The cases in Qianjiang are not discussed in this thesis as the data 
available is very limited. 
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54 “Zhongguo zhengfa daxue xuesheng Yao Yao xuanbu xunqiu Changping qu renda daibiao 
xuanju houxuanren timing (Yao Yao, College Student of Beijing University of Governance and 
Law, Declared to Seek Nomination in Changping District People’s Congress Elections)”, China 
Elections and Governance (www.chinaelections.org), Nov. 18, 2003. 
 
55 Fn. 50. 
 
56 Ibid. 
 
57 Qin Wen, “Xu Zhiyong: Qing xiangxin women de xuanjuquan shi zhenshide (Xu Zhiyong: 
Please Believe that We have Real Election Rights)”, Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolitan 
Daily), December 16, 2003. 
 
58 Ibid. 
 
59 Du Zhaoyong and Zhang Xingshui. “Zhi Haidian qu xuanmin de yi feng gongkai xin (A Letter 
to Voters of Haidian District)”, Beijing Kingdom Law Firm, November 20, 2003.  Zhang 
Xingshui is Director and Partner of the law firm. 
 
60 Ibid. 
 
61 Jiang Yingshuang, “Wang Hai: woxiang canyu guize de zhiding (Wang Hai: I Want to 
Participate in Making the Rules)”, Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolitan Daily), Nov.17, 
2003. 
 
62 Xu Zhiyong, “Wo yao jingxuan renda daibiao (I Want to Run for a People’s Deputy)”, Beida 
Weiming BBS Zhan (The BBS of “Unknown” of Peking Univeristy; http://bbs.pku.edu.cn). 
 
63 Ibid.  Xu is a law professor at Beijing University of Postal and Telecommunication.  In 2003, 
he and other two lawyers submitted a bill to the National People’s Congress of China to ban an 
unconstitutional national regulation, “Chengshi liulang qitao renyuan shourong qiansong banfa 
(Regulations on Custody and Repatriation of Urban Beggers)”, after a college graduate was 
mistakenly recognized as a migrant worker without necessary IDs and were beaten to death in 
the local police bureau in Guangzhou. 
 
64 Yin Jun, “Beijing Daxue shuoshisheng Yin Jun ni zijian canjia benci haidianqun renda 
daibiao jingxuan (The Master’s Student of Beijing University, Yin Jun, Plans to Campaign as an 
Independent Candidate in Haidian District People’s Congress Elections”, China Elections and 
Governance (www.chinaelections.org), Nov. 9, 2003. 
 
65 Du and Zhang (fn. 59). 
 
66 Miao (fn. 37). 
 
67 Ibid. 
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68 Jiang (fn. 61). 
 
69 Chinese officials and China scholars have divided views on village election’s consequences on 
Chinese democratization.  Some believed that village elections have helped establish grassroots 
democratic institutions and rule of law, and have made farmers aware of the democratic rights 
and electoral procedures.  Others, on the contrary, argued that village democracy would not have 
substantial effects on democratization of China without the existence of other institutional and 
cultural factors needed for a democracy.  Some held that grassroots reforms were never as 
effective as that initiated from the top.  For a complete discussion of the debates on the meanings 
of village elections, see Yawei Liu, “Consequences of Villager Committee Elections in China”, 
China Perspectives, No. 31 (September 2000), pp. 19-35. 
 
70 Wang Xiaofei (fn. 44). 
 
71 Interview with the lawyer, August 2003. 
 
72 Only 5 out of 34 campaigners in Shenzhen and Beijing (15%) won the elections.  It suggests 
that the DPCs are still under control of the state. 
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